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1  INTRODUCTION
When instituting a delictual claim for loss of earning capacity, an individual 
needs to submit evidence on a number of matters. The court is called upon to 
weigh the evidence and make an appropriate award. The purpose of this arti-
cle is to provide an overview of the terminology employed, to explain the two 
different ways in which earning capacity is calculated and to illustrate how 
South African courts not only confuse terms with each other and use them 
interchangeably, but also that there is no consistent approach to the way in 
which loss of earning capacity is calculated. Finally it will be argued that it 
is time to address this matter, possibly by looking at other areas of the law, 
such as social security law. Although the current social security system can 
probably not provide solutions to all the problems mentioned in this article, 
an integrated approach to loss of earning capacity is urgently needed and the 
new social security system might just add a much needed new dimension to 
the way in which jurists approach this area of the law.
2  TERMINOLOGY
2.1   The concepts ‘loss of earnings’ and ‘loss of earning capacity’
A lot has been written on loss of earnings and loss of earning capacity. Earn-
ings or income refers to the remuneration received by a person in the exercise 
of his employment, business or profession.
In South African law, a distinction is made between loss of earnings in the 
past and loss of earnings in the future.1 Past loss of earnings, in other words 
loss of earnings prior to the date of settlement or the date of the court order 
is usually referred to only as loss of earnings. The calculation of past loss of 
earnings rarely poses problems. Claimants employed in the formal sector are 
usually able to produce pay slips, tax returns, banking statements and other 
documents to prove what they have earned in the past. Claimants informally 
employed find it more difficult to prove their past loss of income, but the prin- 
 
 
1 Report of the Road Accident Fund Commission (the RAF report) (2002) 999-1000; Klopper H Law of 
third party compensation (2000) 79-80.
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ciple remains the same, namely that a claimant should be compensated for 
his loss that was caused by an unlawful act.
Where a plaintiff will incur loss of earnings after the date of the settlement 
or the date of the court order, such earnings are referred to as future loss of 
earnings. Gough2 states:
‘If one were to regard the loss as one of future earnings one may ask the question: “What 
income will the plaintiff actually lose as a result of the defendant’s wrongful act?”’
The claimant is only entitled to compensation for loss of income that was 
lawfully obtained.3 Illegal income is any income from any illegal activity such 
as an unlicensed business or an activity that is legally against the public 
morals. An example of illegal activity is where a private taxi is operated4 or a 
panel-beating business is operated without a licence.5
In Dhlamini v Protea Assurance Co Ltd6 the court divided illegal income-
producing activities into three categories, namely activities which are in 
themselves immoral, such as prostitution;7 activities which are neither im-
moral nor criminal but which are prohibited for reasons of public policy, such 
as the protection of the public,8 and activities which are neither immoral nor 
criminal in the sense already described, but are those that traders are prohib-
ited from engaging in without a licence.9
Dhlamini has been criticised by academic jurists. Dendy points out that, 
amongst other things, it is difficult to apply the Dhlamini system of classifica-
tion because it is not certain which activities fall within the second category.10 
Dendy’s main criticism of the Dhlamini decision is that it deals with loss of 
earnings, and not with loss of earning capacity.11 Dendy finds support for his 
argument in the judgment of Rumpff CJ in Santam Versekeringsmaatskappy v 
Byleveldt.12 In casu the Court found:
‘Skade is die ongunstige verskil wat deur die onregmatige daad ontstaan het. Die ver-
moënsvermindering moet wees ten opsigte van iets wat op geld waardeerbaar is en sou 
insluit die vermindering veroorsaak deur ’n besering as gevolg waarvan die benadeelde 
nie meer enige inkomste kan verdien nie of alleen maar ‘n laer inkomste verdien. Die ver-
lies van geskiktheid om ’n inkomste te verdien, hoewel gewoonlik gemeet aan die stand-
aard van verwagte inkomste, is ’n verlies van geskiktheid en nie ’n verlies van inkomste 
nie.’13
  2 Gough ‘The “lost years”: The claim for loss of earnings’ (1983) De Rebus 486. 
  3 See RAF report (fn 1 above) 999-1000, See Klopper (fn 1 above) 79-80.
  4 Mba v Southern Insurance 1981 1 SA 122 (Tk). A private taxi is a taxi that is not licensed in accord-
ance with the Road Traffic Act 29 of 1989 or the Road Transportation Act 74 of 1977.
  5 Santam Insurance v Ferguson 1985 4 SA 843 (A).
  6 1974 4 SA 906 (A).
  7 Dendy ‘Illegal income and remunerative loss – I: Claims by income-earners in Southern African Law’ 
(1998) 61 THRHR 564.
  8 Ibid. Here, it may for instance be illegal to sell food on a pavement, as failure to comply with stand-
ards of hygiene may cause illness.
  9 Ibid.
10  See Dendy (fn 7 above) 577.
11  See Dendy (fn 7 above) 579.
12  1973 2 SA 146 (A).
13  At 150 B-D.
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According to this reasoning, the legality of a person’s earnings becomes irrel-
evant once one works with loss of earning capacity and not with future loss 
of earnings. This matter subsequently received the Courts’ attention in three 
similar cases, namely in Lebona v President Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk,14 
Dhlamini v Multilaterale Motorvoertuigongelukkefonds15 and Nkwenteni v Al-
lianz Insurance Co Ltd.16 In Lebona the deceased hawked without a licence 
and in Dhlamini the deceased drove a taxi without a licence. In both cases 
the Courts did not apply the dictum in Dhlamini v Protea Assurance Co Ltd17 
and found that the illegality of the deceased’s activities constituted no bar to 
compensation.18 However, in Nkwenteni, absence of a licence to operate a 
taxi was fatal to the plaintiff’s claim.19 That there is a definite distinction be-
tween loss of earnings and loss of earning capacity is evident from Lebona,20 
Dhlamini21 and Nkwenteni.22 
In addition, the RAF report states:
‘The injuries suffered by a road accident victim may be so severe that he or she is tempo-
rarily or permanently precluded from earning what he or she earned prior to the accident. 
This results in what is known as a “loss of earning capacity” and the victim is entitled to 
claim compensation for all such future loss in a claim calculated on a once-and-for all 
basis.’23
However, if one employs the dictum of the Court in Santam Versekeringsmaat-
skappy v Byleveldt, 24it is evident that the Court draws a clear cut distinction 
between loss of earnings in the future, on the one hand, and loss of earning 
capacity, on the other. Loss of the capacity to earn an income is a loss of ca-
pacity and not a loss of income, even though the loss is calculated by using 
expected income as a measure. 
According to Visser and Potgieter loss of future income occurs ‘where the 
injured X suffers from a disability which prevents him from earning income in 
future’.25 The writers argue that it is more accurate to speak of loss of earning 
capacity.
14  1991 3 SA 395 (W).
15  1992 1 SA 802 (T).
16  1992 2 SA 713 (Ck).
17  See Dhlamini v Protea Assurance Co Ltd (fn 6 above).
18  Boberg ‘Damages for loss of earning capacity- New hope for the illegal earner’ (1993) 56 THRHR 
154.
19  Ibid.
20  See Lebona v President Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk (fn 14 above). 
21  See Dhlamini v Multilaterale Motorvoertuigongelukkefonds (fn 15 above).
22  See Nkwenteni v Allianz Insurance Co Ltd (fn 16 above). On this issue, Boberg, at para 154 convinc-
ingly argues that ‘[o]nce loss of capacity to earn is recognised as the loss to be compensated ... then 
it is open even to a breadwinner whose trade was doomed to offend statute, to recover damages. 
A person, who derives income from an activity that is intrinsically illegal, does not necessarily lack 
the capacity to earn a living in another legal way. Naturally, it would be up to the plaintiff to prove 
that capacity, as well as its market value. But if, in spite of proof, compensation were denied to an 
illegal earner or to his or her dependants, it would be difficult to escape the conclusion that the South 
African law of delict, as did its Roman-law counterpart, sometimes assumes a penal role.’
23  See RAF report (fn 1 above) 1000.
24  See Santam Versekeringsmaatskappy v Byleveldt (fn 12 above)
25  Visser and Potgieter Law of damages 121.
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It is submitted that this confusion surrounding terminology may be simpli-
fied by employing two steps: Firstly, there must be proof of a loss of earning 
capacity before there can be any future loss of earnings. The actual loss of 
earnings is then a manifestation of the inability of a person to earn the same 
income as before, because of the damage-causing event. Secondly, once it 
has been established that there is, in fact, a definite loss of earning capacity, 
an amount must be attached to the incapacity. Therefore, for purposes of 
clarity, it is suggested that earning capacity is a diminution of a claimant’s 
ability to generate an income. 
2.2  Compensation
Once it is established that a legal subject has suffered damage in one form 
or another, it is the task of the court to quantify the damage and to make 
an award. In practice, the words ‘compensation’ and ‘satisfaction’ are often 
used. For purposes of clarity it is important to determine the meanings of 
these terms, and also whether the two are mutually exclusive. Different writ-
ers have different conceptions of these terms. Munkman for instance states: 
‘Compensation is derived from a Latin root ‘compensare’ (weigh together). The funda-
mental principle of every system of civil law is the principle of justice ... We may think of 
the traditional picture of justice, holding a pair of scales. Into one scale goes the harm or 
loss sustained; into the other goes the compensation; and the aim of the law is to make 
the two balance.’26
Visser criticises this explanation, stating that it does not reflect the general 
view of English law.27 He argues that compensation and satisfaction in Eng-
lish law should be understood as two distinct and separate forms of restitu-
tion.28 According to Visser, it is generally accepted that factual restitution is 
only possible in exceptional cases of injury to the personality.29
What content then should jurists attach to compensation? Visser argues 
that compensation is an elementary and basic function in cases of delictual 
liability and refers to the process in terms of which a monetary equivalent 
is given for the affected interests. Compensation is not merely an amount 
of money but an amount which has to achieve a certain purpose, namely 
to put the injured party in the position he would have been in if he had not 
sustained the wrong for which compensation is being awarded.30
Therefore, if Visser’s argument is brought to a logical conclusion, compen-
sation is usually aimed at financial restitution.31 For instance, where a miner 
was injured in an underground accident and suffered a loss of income during 
the time he was hospitalised, that loss of income can be compensated by pay-
ing him the equivalent of the sum of money he lost.
26  Munkman Damages for personal injury and death (1973) 21.
27  Visser ‘Kompensasie van nie-vermoënskade’ (1983) THRHR 45.
28  Ibid.
29  Ibid. Factual restitution is where a plaintiff receives the exact amount of compensation linked direct-
ly to his actual loss, for example: A medical bill of a certain amount is refunded by the defendant.
30  See Visser (fn 27 above) 45. 
31  See Visser (fn 27 above) 46.
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2.3  Satisfaction
Where compensation is the accurate weighing and arriving at a balance 
between damage and compensation,32 ‘satisfaction’ is the term used in the 
South African law to refer to the purpose of two delictual actions:33 Firstly to 
the aim of the actio iniuriarum and secondly to the aim of the action for pain 
and suffering.34
Visser elaborates that the term satisfaction has no fixed content.35 He adds 
that it may be accepted that the basis of satisfaction is found in the principle 
of vindication of the law through penance, retribution and reconciliation.36 
Although the idea of satisfaction is found in Roman law, as is indicated by 
the concept satisfactio,37 Visser and Potgieter hold that the juridical concept 
of satisfaction derives from Swiss law.38 Moreover, satisfaction has no fixed 
meaning and many meanings have been attached to it.39 Visser and Potgi-
eter indicate that satisfaction in a wide sense refers to an upholding of the 
law, while its narrowest meaning relates to the psychological gratification ob-
tained by the victim of a wrongful act. Conversely, the basis of satisfaction is 
to be found in the function of the law to provide a peaceful resolution to any 
dispute.40
Satisfaction is often referred to as an incomplete form of damages. Legal 
systems that acknowledge the fact that non-patrimonial loss as well as patri-
monial loss should be compensated, also acknowledge that non-patrimonial 
loss cannot always be compensated in the same way as patrimonial loss. In 
cases where non-patrimonial loss is incapable of being assessed in a similar 
manner as is patrimonial loss, satisfaction forms the basis of the compensa-
tion. Therefore, satisfaction is in fact a solatium to the victim.41 Visser draws 
a number of noteworthy conclusions about the nature of satisfaction. Firstly, 
the basis of satisfaction is the peaceful resolution of disputes through the law. 
Secondly, the purpose of the process is to regulate society peacefully. Thirdly, 
as the law developed, satisfaction started paring off some of its functions to 
other areas of law such as criminal law and the law of damages. In the fourth 
place, Visser states:
‘In die moderne reg het die genoegdoeningsbeginsel ’n resterende (en dus sekondêre) po-
sisie behou as die ultima ratio van die deliktereg. Genoegdoening in die betekenis van die 
psigiese bevrediging van die benadeelde wanneer sy nie-vermoënskade nie kompenseer-
baar is nie, gee steeds uiting aan die tradisionele genoegdoeningsgedagte. Dit openbaar 
ook ’n objektiewe element van regshandhawing.’42 
32  Ibid.
33  Visser ‘Genoegdoening met betrekking tot nie-vermoënskade’ (1983) TSAR 54.
34  Ibid. 
35  Visser (fn 33 above) states: ‘Onder genoegdoening is al verstaan boetedoening of vergelding, “kom-
pensasie” vir die krenkende daad, “salwing” vir die benadeelde, kompensasie vir die krenking, bev-
rediging van die regsgevoel en vergoeding vir die benadeelde se Selbstgefühl.’
36  See Visser (fn 33 above) 55-56.




41  Visser (See fn 33 above) 63. The writer explains: ‘Genoegdoening in hierdie vorm beteken in werk-
likheid troosvergoeding of solatium soos dit byvoorbeeld in die Skotse reg aangetref word.’
42  Ibid.
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There is no uniform, general guideline for the compensation of non-patrimo-
nial loss in South African law.43 Each case is decided individually by refer-
ence to awards in other comparable cases.44 
There is no uniform table or index that can be used by the courts in de-
termining the amount that should be awarded in a particular case. Instead, 
there are several summaries available in the literature. Firstly, there is Koch’s 
guide,45 secondly, there is Corbett and Buchanan’s The Quantum of Damage 
in Bodily and Fatal Injury Cases46and thirdly, there is the guideline used by 
the Road Accident Fund.47
Although these sources provide guidance to practitioners, the final award for 
non-pecuniary loss still lies within the discretion of the trial judge and the judge is 
not compelled to make an award similar to that made in any other in precedent.48
There are similarities in the ways in which the courts assess loss of earning 
capacity and satisfaction for pain and suffering. The next paragraph looks at 
the two different methods in which loss of earning capacity is approached 
and how the terms ‘compensation’ and ‘satisfaction’ are often confused.
3   ESSENTIALLY TWO METHODS OF CALCULATION: SUM­
FORMULA VERSUS ‘SOMEHOW­OR­OTHER’ APPROACH
When assessing a claimant’s loss of earning capacity, the courts employ es-
sentially two methods: The first approach is to establish a reasonable and fair 
amount based on the proven facts and the prevailing circumstances (here-
after, the ‘somehow-or-other approach’).49 According to this approach, the 
court exercises its discretion in a manner similar to that in which the court 
makes an award for pain and suffering. The second approach is to establish 
an amount by mathematical calculation made from the proven facts of the 
case (hereafter, the ‘mathematical approach’).50 In the discussion of South 
African case law, examples of both methods will be used.
Both these approaches have merits. The courts are likely to follow the first 
approach in circumstances where it is not possible to make a mathematical 
calculation for example, where the victim is a minor who has not yet em-
barked on a career path. 
43  See RAF report (fn 1 above) 1108.
44  See Protea Assurance v Lamb 1971 1 SA 530 (A) at 536A.
45  Koch The Quantum Yearbook (published annually).
46  There are two editions of this work published in 1985 and 1992 respectively.This loose-leaf publi-
cation contains concise information on awards made in both reported and unreported High Court 
cases. The publication is sub-divided under specific injuries. The summary of each case contains 
information on the age and gender of the victim as well as the nature of the injuries, the treatment 
received as well as any permanent impairment that is expected in future. Apart from an exposition of 
non-patrimonial damages awarded in each case, a summary of patrimonial damages is also given. 
47  The Road Accident Fund is a statutory compensation fund. The primary function of the Fund is to 
compensate the victims of road accidents. See also Section 19 (a) of the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 
1996. 
48  Ibid.
49  See Klopper (fn 1 above) 177; Koch Damages for lost income (1984) 158. The phrase ‘some-how-
or-other’ was actually coined by Koch to denote the non-mathematical way of calculating loss of 
earning capacity.
50  Ibid.
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Most writers prefer the second approach. Klopper states:
‘At least an assessment based on a mathematical calculation has some semblance of 
logic and science. However, a mathematical calculation can only be as reliable as the 
facts and assumptions used in arriving at an answer.’51
According to Corbett and Buchanan, this mathematical calculation should 
ideally be done in the following way:
‘(1)   Calculate the present value of the future income which the plaintiff would have 
earned but for his injuries and consequent disability;
 (2)   Calculate the present value of the plaintiff’s estimated future income, if any, having 
regard to his disability;
 (3)   subtract the figure obtained under (2) from that obtained under (1);
 (4)   adjust the figure obtained as a result of this subtraction in the light of all relevant 
factors and contingencies.’52
The caution raised about the low levels of reliability in assumptions alerts 
the practitioner and the court to the fact that both approaches involve a fair 
amount of guesswork. It is submitted that the guesswork is inherent in the 
process of calculating any form of future damages. 
It is submitted that a material difference exists between the loss of earnings 
calculated by means of the sum-formula approach and an award made for 
loss of earning capacity based on the ‘some-how-or-other’ approach. The lat-
ter is a practical way of compensating a claimant for his loss of earning capac-
ity where it is accepted that the victim did sustain a loss but it is not conven-
ient or possible to use the sum-formula approach.53 What often happens in 
practice is that the parties agree amongst themselves to settle the claim on a 
somewhat unconventional basis by awarding more for pain and suffering. By 
doing this, the defendant accepts that the claimant’s loss of earning capacity 
is but one of the many facets of the claimant’s personality that was impaired. 
Because of insufficient evidence on the claimant’s pre- and post-trauma earn-
ings, a higher award is made for pain and suffering, while no award or only 
a small award is made in respect of the claimant’s loss of earnings. It must 
be re-iterated that this is a practical solution used by practitioners in order 
to avoid going to trial. Because there are no trials and no subsequent case 
reports, it is virtually impossible to estimate how many cases are settled in 
this fashion. 
The next paragraph looks at a number of important cases in which these 
two different approaches are evident.
51  See Klopper (fn 1 above) 177.
52  Corbett M and Buchanan The quantum of damage in bodily and fatal injury cases (1992) 62.
53  The sum-formula approach is widely criticised, see Visser and Potgieter (fn 25 above) 64-67. The 
authors state that although the sum-formula approach is part of the South African law of damages, 
it seems that the courts only pay ‘lip-service’ to this method without actually following it, at 66. To 
substantiate this point, the authors quote Santam Versekeringsmaatskappy v Byleveldt 1973 2 SA 
146 (A) at 150 where it is stated that: ‘[D]ie verskil tussen die vermoënsposisie van die benadeelde 
voor die onregmatige daad en daarna... Skade is die ongunstige verskil wat deur die onregmatige 
daad ontstaan het’. Visser and Potgieter correctly observe that this does not reflect the sum-formula 
approach as it fails to mention the hypothetical patrimonial position.
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4  EXPOSITION OF CASE LAW
1.1  Introduction
As stated above, the courts basically use two methods of calculation when 
assessing a claimant’s loss of earning capacity. The exposition that follows 
looks at only a few of these earliest precedents and it highlights the most 
important principles. I shall refer to ‘the plaintiff’ to denote the injured party 
throughout the discussion of the cases as it is always the injured party who 
issues summons against the wrongdoer and/or his insurance company. In ap-
peal court cases, reference will also be made to the plaintiff and the defend-
ant instead of the appellant and the respondent for purposes of clarity. 
4.2  Clair v Port Elizabeth Harbour Boar; Kennedy v The Same
The plaintiff Clair was a boatman employed at Port Elizabeth and the defend-
ants were the Board of Commissioners for the harbour of Port Elizabeth.54 
In the court a quo (Port Elizabeth Circuit Court), Maasdorp J found that the 
explosion that caused injuries to the first claimant and the death of the de-
pendants of the second claimant was due to the negligence of the defend-
ants.55 The Court on appeal therefore moved to the issue of quantum and in 
determining the extent of the liability, Barry JP quoted Hume v The Divisional 
Council of Cradock,56 a case in which he had presided. In that case Barry JP 
had stated:
‘[I]n assessing damages I cannot go into strict mathematical calculations. Were I to do 
so, the law tells me I should do wrong. As a juror I have to give damages in a round sum. 
I must take into consideration the pain and the suffering as well as the pecuniary loss to 
the plaintiff.’57
Barry JP gave effect to the dictum in the Phillips case58 and in his final judg-
ment, he re-iterated the law and stated that:
‘It must also be borne in mind that although Clair has become permanently incapacitated 
as a boatman, yet, broken down as he is, he might earn something in some other occupa-
tion. But I shall not enlarge upon possibilities, and bearing in mind that I have to give 
a fair and reasonable compensation, both for the pecuniary loss and for the pain, the 
 
54  1886 5 EDC 311.
55  In casu the plaintiff was injured by the explosion of a boiler of a crane that was caused by the col-
lapsing of the shell of a firebox. The firebox was corroded to such an extent that the explosion was 
a natural consequence of the corrosion. The defendants could have discovered the defect in the 
firebox if they had exercised ordinary care. However, the defendants did not apply the test to detect 
such defect. 
56  1 Buch. EDC Rep. 117.
57  At 315. Barry JP also quotes Lord Justice Bramwell in Phillips v The London and South Western 
Railway Company Limited 5 CPD 280. In the latter case, Bramwell LJ stated as follows: ‘[T]hat the 
proper direction to a jury should be – you must give the plaintiff compensation for his pecuniary loss, 
you must give him compensation for his pain and bodily suffering; of course it is almost impossible 
for you to give to an injured man what can be strictly called compensation; but you must take a 
reasonable view of the case, and must consider under all the circumstances what is a fair amount to 
be awarded to him’ at 316. Barry JP then went on to quote Lord Justice Brett’s address to the jury in 
Phillips v The London and South Western Railway Company Limited, who had instructed the jury as 
follows: ‘[The jury] must not attempt to give an absolutely perfect compensation with respect to the 
pecuniary loss, the reason being that human ingenuity has not been able to devise a more correct 
proposition, and that if a Judge tries to make a perfect proposition, he either states something which 
is wrong, or omits to state something which ought to be stated.’
58  See (fn 58 above)
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conclusion I have arrived at is that £800 should be the measure of damages awarded to 
the plaintiff Clair, together with costs.’59
It is clear from the decision that Barry JP followed the somehow-or-other 
approach. It is not clear from the case whether mathematical or actuarial 
evidence was submitted at all. The judge seems to have relied on what he 
regarded as perfectly good law by awarding an amount that is fair and reason-
able under the circumstances.
4.3  McKenzie v S.A. Taxi-Cab Co
In casu the plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle collision.60 He was initially 
hospitalised and after his discharge, he went to Durban to recover from his 
injuries. In his judgment, Bristowe J ruled:61 
‘As I intend to allow the plaintiff for wages lost during absence from work, I cannot allow 
his living expenses in Durban, but the fare to Durban will be allowed. In respect of wages 
the plaintiff is entitled to £98,15s and for clothes which were damaged a further sum of 
£6, 6s.6d. Taking into consideration the permanent injury to the plaintiff’s thumb and his 
disfigurement, I think that an inclusive sum of £200 will be a reasonable compensation.’62
From this passage it transpires that the Judge viewed compensation as a lump 
sum. This sum included an award for pain and suffering which are actually 
satisfaction and not compensation, as well as an award for the permanent 
injury to the plaintiff’s thumb. There was no discussion whatsoever on loss of 
earning capacity and it seems as though the permanent injury to the thumb 
was not even considered as a specific impairment that could possibly lead to 
a loss and ultimately form a separate head of damages. As in the case of Clair 
v Port Elizabeth Harbour Board,63 the Judge followed the somehow-or-other 
approach.
4.4  Sandler v Wholesale Coal Suppliers64
In this decision, the appellant was injured in an accident caused by the neg-
ligence of the respondent’s servants.65 The appellant alleged on appeal that 
the amount of compensation was insufficient. The Court was faced with the 
task of assessing the loss of earning capacity of a self-employed person.66 
The appellant argued that he was hospitalised for four months and thereafter 
he was only able to be present at his business occasionally.67 The trial court 
found that the appellant’s absence from his business did not cause a loss of 
business and that the fact that no cars had been sold, may also have been 
caused by the outbreak of World War II.68 On appeal, Watermeyer JA com-
mented as follows:
59  At 317.
60  1910 WLD 232.
61  At 234.
62  Own emphasis.
63  See (fn 54 above)
64  1941 AD 194. See also Klopper Casebook on third party compensation (2004) 43.
65  At 197.
66  Ibid.
67  Ibid.
68  At 198.
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‘On this point I take a different view. When the owner of a business of this nature, who 
works in it in the ordinary way in which the appellant worked, is confined to hospital for 
four months and unable to do the work which he previously did, the business as a profit-
earning concern must necessarily suffer. It seems reasonable to assume that the appellant’s 
skill and energy and his activities in the affairs of the business were a source of some profit 
to the business.’69
The judge awarded a sum of £100 for past loss of earnings, an amount that he 
found reasonable under the circumstances.70 Although this award was in fact 
made for past loss of earnings, it is interesting to note that the Appeal Court 
does not base its conclusion on a strict mathematical calculation of damages. 
The Appeal Court reasoned:
‘When these matters are taken into consideration together with plaintiff’s statement that 
his business became disorganised, the extracts from the books showing a diminution in 
volume of business, a smaller rate of profit and no sales of cars at all while appellant was 
in hospital, I think that amounts to reasonably sufficient proof that appellant’s absence 
caused some loss to the business.’71
On future loss of earning capacity, the Court made an even more interesting 
order. It was accepted that the plaintiff’s injuries resulted in a permanent dis-
ability.72 Instead of dealing with the plaintiff’s possible future loss of earnings 
separately, the Court combined an award for permanent disability with an 
award for pain and suffering. The Court stated:
‘The question now arises whether this Court should increase the amount awarded to the 
appellant for pain and suffering and permanent disability. In considering that question it 
must be recognised that though the law attempts to repair the wrong done to a sufferer 
who has received personal injuries in an accident by compensating him in money, yet 
there are no scales by which pain and suffering can be measured, and there is no rela-
tionship between pain and money which makes it possible to express the one in terms 
of the other with any approach to certainty. The amount to be awarded as compensation 
can only be determined by the broadest general considerations and the figure arrived at 
must necessarily be uncertain, depending upon the judge’s view of what is fair in all the 
circumstances of the case. For this reason a Court of Appeal does not readily interfere 
with an estimate made by the Court appealed from.’73
Despite the reluctance of the court to increase an award for damages on ap-
peal, it increased the amount of compensation to £1 000.74
This decision is important for a number for reasons. Firstly, the court em-
ployed the somehow-or-other approach to calculate past loss of earnings, 
despite the fact that the plaintiff submitted books to substantiate his claim. 





72  At 199. On the matter of permanent disability, the court analysed the medical evidence and stated: 
‘There is now much scar tissue around the knee which requires protection because it is liable to 
break down if it receives a severe blow or if the skin is broken by friction. The knee joint can only 
bend 90 degrees, instead of 160 degrees as in a normal knee. The knee is still weak and unable to 
bear the appellant’s full weight. In the opinion of the surgeon who performed the operation further 
improvement cannot be expected.’
73  At 199. On the appeal court’s reluctance to interfere in matters concerning damages, the Court 
quoted the following precedents, namely Salzman v Holmes 1914 AD 471 at 480, Sutter v Brown 
1926 AD 155 at 173; Versfeld v South African Fruit Farms Ltd. 1930 AD 452 at 462 and Black and 
others v Joseph 1931 AD 132 at 150.
74  At 200.
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what this term means. In the final instance, the Court made one award for 
pain and suffering and permanent disability. 
It is submitted that this approach illustrates the fact that the Court accepted 
that there was a loss of earning capacity that resulted from the plaintiff’s per-
manent disability, but the Court failed to make an award in terms of the actio 
legis Aquilia. Instead, in line with the somehow-or-other approach, the Court 
awarded a global amount in terms of the action for pain and suffering.75
4.5  Watt v Van der Walt76
Although this is not an appeal court case like Sandler v Wholesale Coal Sup-
pliers,77 this decision by the Witwatersrand Local Division seems to be tech-
nically more correct.78 On future loss of earnings, the court stated that:
‘What is really required is actuarial evidence which would take into account all the changes 
which may befall the plaintiff during the rest of his life and lead to a satisfactory assessment 
of present value of his probable loss of earnings in the future. There is no such evidence. 
Making the best estimate I can I shall award the plaintiff £800 under this head.’79
It is evident from the above dictum that the Judge did not choose between the 
somehow-or-other approach and the mathematical approach, but rather fol-
lowed the somehow-or-other approach out of necessity because of the lack of 
actuarial evidence. The lack of actuarial evidence was clearly not fatal to the 
plaintiff’s claim for future loss of earnings and the Court awarded an amount 
that was fair and reasonable in the circumstances and in the light of all the 
evidence.
4.6  Spencer v Barclays Bank80
In considering the award of damages for disability, the Court observed that 
the plaintiff’s injured hand was of no practical use to him as a draughtsman.81 
The Court used the same approach as in Watt v van der Walt82 and included 
in the award for pain and suffering and loss of amenities of life an award for 
permanent disability. Price J commented:
75  The court’s dictum: ‘The amount to be awarded as compensation can only be determined by the 
broadest general considerations and the figure arrived at must necessarily be uncertain, depending 
upon the Judge’s view of what is fair in all the circumstances of the case.’ The Courts dictum was 
applied in Southern Insurance Association Ltd v Bailey NO 1984 1 SA 98 (A) at 119 G-H.
76  1947 2 SA 1216.
77  See (fn 64 above).
78  See (fn 75 above). In casu the plaintiff suffered a dislocation of the left hip joint and a fracture of the 
tibia and fibula at the junction between the middle and the lower third of the left leg. The dislocation 
was immediately reduced. The leg was amputated the next day at the site of the fracture. The Court 
found on the evidence that the plaintiff would be able to return to his employment after the fitment 
of an artificial limb. It was also accepted that there was still some disability, although not as high as 
the 30% awarded in terms of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. 
79  At 273.
80  1947 3 SA 230 (T). In casu the plaintiff was hurt when he slipped on the polished step of the block 
of flats where he rented a flat. The plaintiff severely injured his left arm when his arm broke through 
the pane of a glass window next to the staircase (on 230). The cut to the plaintiff’s left arm was deep 
and long. Immediately after the accident, the plaintiff had no sensation in his hand and suffered 
a lack of free movement of his hand. The plaintiff, who worked as a draughtsman for the Forestry 
Department, recovered gradually from his injury, but experienced a permanent disability.
81  At 245.
82  See (fn 77 above). See also Corbett and Buchanan Quantum 56.
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‘In his capacity as a draughtsman he has to use various instruments ... and he says that 
some of these instruments have to be manipulated or placed by means of his left hand, 
and that in some cases both hands have to be used, that his work is not so quick or as 
efficient as it was, and that he is inconvenienced in his ordinary work and his efficiency 
has suffered. I suppose that in many of the ordinary things he has to do, such as putting 
on his collars and tying his ties, and all those things for which one uses two hands – he 
will suffer some disability.’83
The Judge proceeded to award an amount of £750 for pain and suffering and 
loss of amenities of life. There was also an award of £125 for special damages. 
The Court did not make a separate award for future loss of earnings, and this 
leads one to conclude that the Judge regarded loss of earning capacity, or at 
the very least permanent disability, as part and parcel of the award for pain 
and suffering and loss of the amenities of life.
In a case such as this, a testing model for disability would have assisted the 
Court in determining the extent of the plaintiff’s disability, thus enabling the 
Court to make a more accurate and better reasoned award.
4.7  Goldie v City Council of Johannesburg84
In casu the court was confronted with a plaintiff who sustained severe injuries 
in a tram accident.85 It was common cause that the plaintiff would never be 
able to return to work.86 In arriving at an appropriate award for future loss of 
earnings, Ettlinger AJ stated:
‘From this point proper allowance must be made for various contingencies, but if the 
fundamental principle of an award of damages under the Lex Aquilia is compensation for 
patrimonial loss, then it seems to me that one must try to ascertain the value of what was 
lost on some logical basis and not on impulse or by guesswork.’87
The Judge continued to base his award for loss of earning capacity partly on 
the evidence and report of an actuary and partly on estimations and calcula-
tions he made himself.88 Even though this calculation of future damages is 
not a mere acceptance of the actuarial evidence and although the Judge was 
still using his own discretion and assumptions, this judgment is definitely an 
example of the mathematical method as opposed to the somehow-or-other-
method.
83  At 245.
84  1948 2 SA 913 (W). See also Klopper Casebook 27.
85  Ettlinger AJ remarked : ‘The plaintiff sustained a fractured spine, fractured ribs, a fractured pelvis 
and an injured knee and various lacerations, bruises and abrasions. According to the evidence these 
occasioned considerable pain, and the possibility of future arthritic pains is ever present. He also 
underwent an operation to his knee under a general anaesthetic. He is now suffering from head-
aches, insomnia and impotence. He is over 47 years of age now and whereas he had been bright and 
cheerful he is now dull, depressed and apathetic ... None of his symptoms are likely to disappear or 
improve. On the contrary the great probability is that he will within a few years become bedridden 
and gradually die’ at 924.
86  At 920.
87  At 920.
88  At 922.
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4.8  Mkhize v The South British Insurance Co Ltd89
The plaintiff’s disability resulted from a broken upper left arm. After two oper-
ations the plaintiff was left without an elbow joint.90 The arm was completely 
useless and the only question before the Court was what would constitute an 
appropriate amount for pain and suffering, loss of amenities and disfigure-
ment.91
In this case, as in all the cases already discussed, except for Goldie v City 
Council of Johannesburg,92 the Court once again made an award for pain and 
suffering that included the plaintiff’s disability. Hathorn J P stated that:
‘I have mentioned work and employment, not as indicating loss of earning power, with 
which I am not concerned, but as indicating the loss of one of the important amenities 
of life.’93
Once again, the Court considers loss of earning capacity as one of the ameni-
ties of life, and not of a separate head of damages recoverable with the actio 
legis Aquilia. The Court followed Sandler v Wholesale Coal Suppliers Ltd94 and 
awarded an amount which it considered to be fair in all the circumstances of 
the case. This is clearly an example of the some-how-or-other approach.
4.9  Botha v Minister of Transport95
This case presented nothing new in terms of definitions or the calculation of a 
plaintiff’s disability,96 but what is of significance here is that the Court accept-
ed figures presented by a witness in arriving at an award. The Court ruled:
‘It is largely a matter of guess-work on the evidence to arrive at a percentage figure of dis-
ability but after weighing all the evidence and bearing in mind the points made in the valu-
able argument addressed by both counsel. I have come to the conclusion that a fair figure to 
take as the percentage of the plaintiff’s disability would be 55 per cent in respect of both the 
loss of his one leg and of the serious changes brought about in his mental and personality 
condition. This on the figures of Mr Eriksen, which were quite uncontroverted, results in a 
present value of the plaintiff’s estimated future loss of earnings of £5,325.’97
It is not clear from the case in what capacity Mr Eriksen testified. It does seem 
that figures were in fact presented as evidence and one is led to believe that the 
Court in casu employed a mathematical approach in arriving at an award.
89  1948 4 SA 33 (D).
90  At 35.
91  At 34.
92  See (fn 84 above).
93  At 37.
94  See (fn 65 above).
95  1956 4 SA 375 (W).
96  In casu the plaintiff’s left leg was amputated below the knee (see 376 E). Williamson J stated: ‘If 
this leg injury stood alone it would have carried compensation for a marked diminution in his future 
earning capacity, probably up to 25 per cent and in addition the award of a substantial sum for pain 
and suffering and loss of amenities.’ The plaintiff also sustained a head injury. This injury lead to 
depression and a change of personality (see 377A-H).
  97  At 379 D-E.
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4.10  Gillbanks v Sigournay98
In casu Henochsberg J made a particularly interesting observation about the 
calculation of future loss of earnings. The Judge stated that a court was not 
required to give an absolutely perfect compensation and that exact mathe-
matical compensation was impossible.99 On the matter of actuarial evidence, 
the Judge stated:
‘Actuarial expert evidence is in such cases always of considerable assistance, but the Court 
is not bound by such evidence; it retains its discretion and its assessment of contingencies is 
still necessary, but in a fundamental question such as assessing how much capital must be 
paid to a person at this stage in order to enable that person to have a fixed sum per week or 
per month for a stated period the evidence of an expert is invaluable.’100
The court here still favoured the mathematical approach above the some-
how-or-other approach, even though neither can result in awarding perfect 
compensation.
This case was taken on appeal, which appeal was reported as Sigournay v 
Gillbanks.101 On appeal, Van Wyk AJA ruled: 
‘The amount of £10,000 awarded is undoubtedly very high – possibly higher than I would have 
awarded; but if one has regard to all the facts, and particularly if one compares the healthy 
young man before the accident with the wreck of to-day, one cannot say that the award is either 
extravagant or unreasonable. The appeal should accordingly be dismissed with costs.’102
Consequently, the appellate division endorsed the manner in which the trial 
court had awarded compensation.
4.11  Brijlall v Naidoo and Naidoo (Second Defendants)103
On the pleadings of this case, the Court was faced with a claim for ‘gen-
eral damages in respect of all the consequences described in paragraph 9 
above’.104 One of these consequences was the plaintiff’s loss of earning ca-
pacity as well as his damages for pain, suffering and discomfort, for disfigure-
ment and for permanent disability and loss of amenities.105 It is interesting 
that the plaintiff claimed for loss of earning capacity as well as for disability. 
In awarding damages, the Court made a calculation, taking into account that 
the plaintiff was disabled and that the plaintiff had been gainfully employed 
before the accident. Caney J stated that:
‘I arrive at a figure of £4,400 as the present value of the plaintiff’s loss of future earnings 
from the time I estimate he will be able to re-commence work ... No actuarial evidence 
was led, nor any evidence of other employment (and its rewards) open to one disabled as 
the plaintiff is. I have done the best I can with the information placed before me.’106
  98  1959 2 SA 11 (N). In casu the plaintiff sustained several minor injuries as well as compound com-
minuted fractures of the left tibia and fibula. It was apparent from the evidence that an amputa-
tion above the knee would render the plaintiff more mobile and comfortable. See also Corbett and 
Buchanan Quantum 56.
  99  At 14H-15A.
100 At 15B.
101  1960 2 SA 552 (A).
102  At 590B-C.
103  1961 Corbett and Buchanan Quantum 266 (D).
104  At 269.
105  At 270.
106  At 271.
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The court in fact employed the mathematical approach, although the finer 
details usually incorporated in a mathematical calculation such as tax de-
ductions were not taken into account.107 The award for pain and suffering 
included a component for permanent disability, although it seems that dis-
ability in this context refers more to a general disability and not necessarily 
the inability to generate an income.108
4.12  Comment and suggestions
Although numerous decisions have been made on this point, courts still use 
either of the two approaches and a discussion of each case is not possible, 
given the large volume of decided cases.109 The above exposition of the posi-
tive law illustrates the prevailing principle that the courts attempt to com- 
pensate a victim as fully as possible. However, it seems that loss of earning 
capacity remains problematic, regardless of the endless attempts to unravel 
and explain the matter. In this regard, Spier comments:
‘But in the courts, single points of law are placed under a microscope; the broader view 
tends to be forgotten.’110 
The uncertainty that surrounds loss of earning capacity creates a situation in 
which a prospective plaintiff takes pot luck when lodging a claim, not being 
sure exactly how to prepare evidence and what the court may do with such 
evidence. Probably, if such a claimant were to benefit from social protection 




108  Ibid. In this regard, the Court stated: ‘For pain, suffering and discomfort, for disfigurement (includ-
ing his bent nose) and for the permanence of his disabilities (apart from their effect on his earning 
capacity) and loss of amenities, I consider the plaintiff is entitled to receive a substantial sum. In my 
view a sum of £1,500 would be fair and reasonable.’
109  In the following cases, the Court used the some-how-or-other approach: Wessels v Rondalia Verseker-
ingskorporasie van Suid-Afrika Bpk 1962 Corbett and Buchanan Vol IV 562 (T); Reid v South African 
Railways and Harbours 1965 2 SA 181 (D); Roberts NO v Northern Assurance Co Ltd 1964 4 SA 531 
(D); Commercial Union Assurance Co of SA Ltd and Another v Stanley1973 1 SA 699 (A); Stephenson 
NO v General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corporation Ltd 1974 4 SA 503 (RAD); Roxa v Mtshayi 
1975 3 SA 761 (A); AA Onderlinge Assuransie Assosiasie v Sodoms 1980 3 SA 134 (A); Blyth v Van 
den Heever 1980 1 SA 191 (A); Dyssel NO v Shield Insurance Co Ltd 1982 3 SA 1084 (C); Carstens 
NO v Southern Insurance Association Ltd 1985 3 SA 1010; General Accident Insurance Co SA Ltd v 
Summers; Southern Versekeringsassosiasie Bpk v Carstens NO; General Accident Insurance Co Ltd v 
Nhlumayo 1987 3 SA 577 (A); Gallie NO v National Employers General Insurance Co Ltd 1992 2 SA 
731 (C); Du Bois v Motor Vehicle Accident Fund 1992 4 SA 368 (T); Kommissaris van Binnelandse 
Inkomste en ’n ander v Hogan 1993 4 SA 150 (A); Griffiths v Mutual and Federal Insurance Co Ltd 
1994 1 SA 535 (A) and Muller v Mutual and Federal Insurance Co Ltd and Another 1994 2 SA 425 
(C). On the other hand, the mathematical approach seems to have been used in the following cases: 
De Wet v Phoenix Assurance Co Ltd 1963 Corbett and Buchanan Quantum 196 (T); Santam Verseker-
ingsmaatskappy Bpk v Byleveldt 1973 2 SA 146 (A); Shield Insurance Co Ltd v Hall 1976 4 SA 431 (A); 
AA Mutual Insurance Association Ltd v Maquila 1978 1 SA 805 (A); Goodall v President Insurance Co 
Ltd 1978 1 SA 389 (W); Dippenaar v Shield Insurance Co. Ltd 1979 2 SA 904 (AD); Marine & Trade 
Insurance Co Ltd v Katz NO 1979 4 SA 961 (A); Van der Plaats v SA Mutual Fire and General Insur-
ance Co 1980 3 SA 105 (A); Krugell v Shield Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 1982 4 SA 95 (T); Southern 
Insurance Association Ltd v Bailey NO1984 1 SA 98 (A); Minister of Defence and Another v Jackson 
1991 4 SA 23 ZSC; President Insurance Co Ltd v Matthews 1992 1 SA 1 (A) and Motor Vehicle Ac-
cident Fund v Andreano 1993 3 SA 227 (T). 
110  ‘Apocalypse Scenario’s: De prijs van de onzekerheid na de aanslagen in de Verenigde Staten op 
11 September 2001 en de daarop volgende economische ellende’ in Faure and Neethling (ed) 
Aansprakelijkheid, risico en onderneming: Europese en Zuid-Afrikaanse perspectieven (2003) 3.
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efits for loss of earnings or even welfare benefits, the problem of his earning 
capacity would have been significantly reduced. An important development 
in the field of social protection in South Africa is the announcement made by 
the Minister of Finance, Trevor Manuel, on the introduction of a brand new 
system of social protection. In the 2007 Budget speech (that was delivered on 
21 February 2007), Manual made the following announcement:
‘The time has come to put in place a new arrangement in which all South Africans will 
share, and that provides a basic saving and social protection system that meets the needs 
of low-income employees. We are therefore proposing a mandatory, earnings-related so-
cial security scheme to provide improved unemployment insurance, disability and death 
benefits targeted at the income needs of dependants and a standard retirement savings 
arrangement. This will be financed by a social security tax administered by the South 
African Revenue Service, and collected in individual accounts in the name of every con-
tributor.’111
The focus of this new proposed social protection system is on equity, pooling 
of risk, mandatory participation, administrative efficiency and solidarity.112 If 
properly administered, this new system will have far reaching consequences, 
not only for social security in South Africa, but also for loss of earning capac-
ity. There are a number of problems in the area of loss of earning capacity 
that may be solved by this new system. First, it will be possible, for the first 
time, to keep track of the income of the whole population. Sufficient evidence 
of past earnings will make it easier to predict future earnings. Secondly, lower 
income earners and those with an erratic employment history will for the first 
time be forced to become self-reliant and will not have all their eggs in one 
basket when faced with a traumatic event that negatively impacts on their 
earning capacity. Finally, it is possible that loss of earning capacity will be 
sufficiently dealt with in this new comprehensive social security system, with 
the result that it will not be necessary to deal with this aspect in a private law 
claim based on delict. It will be interesting to see whether the new proposed 
social security system will usurp some of the functions of the law of damages, 
as loss of earning capacity in private law is essentially the same as income 
replacement for disability in social security law.
To say that the proposed social protection measures will totally overcome 
this problem is speculative in the extreme. However, it is submitted that these 
measures have the potential to address the crucial issue of loss of earning 
capacity under social security instead of private law, reducing the significance 
of the confusion that currently prevails.
5  CONCLUSION
It is submitted that the award for loss of earning capacity on the basis of 
the somehow-or-other approach where the judge awards an amount that is 
deemed fair and reasonable in the circumstances, based on the evidence 
placed before the court, is in essence the same as a solatium and does not 
differ essentially from general damages awarded for pain and suffering.
111  2007 Budget Speech, accessed at www.treasury.gov.za 29.
112  Ibid.
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Even where the mathematical approach is employed, the judge still ex-
ercises a wide discretion in the calculation of the so-called imponderables 
like contingencies and the application of these contingencies still depends on 
what is fair and reasonable, based on the evidence presented to the court.
Although these inconsistencies may be said to be an inevitable conse-
quence of the ‘once and for all rule’, it is submitted that the development of 
the law of damages has been stifled on this point. Each of the claimants in 
the cases discussed in paragraph 4 could possibly have been in an altogether 
different situation, were they entitled to extensive social protection benefits, 
notably income replacement for permanent disability. Unfortunately, an in-
tegrated social security system will not do much to solve the problem of the 
loss of earning capacity of young children, unless the system is also designed 
to protect the interests of disabled children to provide future income replace-
ment benefits.
The new social security system is still at the conception stage and the exact 
workings of the system have not been announced. It is suggested however 
that the next logical step in the development of the law pertaining to loss of 
earning capacity may be to recognise the role of this form of damages in the 
socio-economic context and to explore the ways in which integrate the law of 
damages and social protection such as envisaged by the South African gov-
ernment. Such an integrated approach may solve the seemingly insurmount-
able problem of loss of earning capacity. 
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